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Abstract 
In this paper, we study the Ph.D academic job market. Based on the Gale and Shapley algorithm, we 
analyse whether a social planner can improve market efficiency by truncation, i.e., exogenously 
imposing a limit on the number of possible applications. Using simulations, we derive the optimal 
truncation level which balances the trade-off between being unmatched and gaining a better match in 
the aggregate. When graduates apply to their most preferred positions, we find that aggregate 
efficiency can be improved by limiting the number of applications. In particular, the limit can be 
considerable if the graduates' preferences over the positions are not very correlated. The derived limit 
is still the best one when graduates respond strategically (applying to universities which are at least 
individually most preferred at the expenses of those most preferred commonly) in a conservative 
sense: given the strategic behaviour of the graduates, the market efficiency can be further improved by 
choosing an even lower limit on the number of applications. Overall, this paper suggests a direction to 
improve the matching market for Ph.D. candidates by improving the quality of their matches and 
lowering the hiring costs for universities. 
Keywords 
Matching markets, Truncation, Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, Preference 
misrepresentation 
  
 
1. Introduction1
In the last decades, an increased number of research doctorates have been
awarded all over the world. The number of new doctorates increased by 40%
between 1998 and 2008 (Cyranoski et al., 2011).2 Nonetheless, the num-
ber of tenured positions in academia has decreased. As a consequence, the
competition for new academic positions is signiﬁcantly increased, and the
number of applications received by universities in the recruitment period is
abundant. The present paper, motivated by this evidence, presents a ra-
tionale for imposing a limit on the number of possible applications in the
context of the one-to-one matching problem. We show that the introduction
of this restriction can increase the match eﬃciency. This ﬁnding may seem
counter-intuitive because a larger pool of candidates undoubtedly has the
advantage of guaranteeing an ample choice set for both sides of the market
and, in principle, a better matching for universities. However, the recruit-
ment committees would have to look at a larger number of applications,
which has some direct costs in terms of time and resources. In contrast,
with the advent of the Internet and the web, the costs for applicants have
became negligible. The problem has been exacerbated by the introduction of
on-line platforms, such as EconJobMarket.org (EJM).3 Since fall 2007, EJM
operates as an intermediary in the job market for academic economists, pro-
viding a secure central repository for the ﬁles of candidates. But in a very
short time, the average number of applications that an employer receives per
advertisement posted on EJM increased dramatically, from 134 in 2008/2009
to 242 in 2011/2012 (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2013). Thus, those on-line labor
market intermediaries, originally created to improve the information ﬂows
between market participants, turned out to be the vehicle through which
recruiters receive hundreds of applications.
Market participants are already concerned that there are too many ap-
1This working paper has been written during our stay at the EUI. Balter and Senyuta
are grateful to the Max Weber Programme. Rancan thanks the RSCAS for the hospitality.
The authors have beneﬁted from discussion with David Levine, Ramon Marimon, Jordi
Masso´, and Antonio Nicolo´. All remaining errors are ours.
2A signiﬁcant number of them were awarded in China, which has recently become the
world’s biggest producer of Ph.D.s, overtaking the U.S.
3Other intermediaries in the labor market for economists include Econ-jobs.com, Econ-
jobs.com, thesupplycurve.com, and Walras.org. More broadly, for academic jobs, there is
Academickeys.com, and in the general labor market a well-known web site is Monster.com.
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plications submitted per job position (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2013). In order
to help deal with the numerous applications submitted via EJM, a special
web-based software, HeadHunter,4 was developed. The problem with EJM
is that it helps to collect the applications, but not to analyze them. Head-
Hunter was developed to organize and coordinate the process of analyzing the
applications in electronic form. This software has a direct connection to the
EJM. When an institution places an advertisement for a position on EJM,
all application materials for that position are transferred by HeadHunter to
a separate database. HeadHunter allows recruiting committee to analyze the
applications eﬀectively, rate them, communicate and make decisions about
interviews. It enables a recruiting committee to track the applicants from
the moment they have applied for the position to the ﬁnal stage of making
oﬀers. The time the recruiting committee spends on sorting documents and
identifying what items in the applicant folders are missing is decreased. In
turn, the committee has more time to read the contents of the applications.
In addition to the costs of processing the applications, it might be more
diﬃcult to identify the proper candidate to interview, and ﬁnally, to oﬀer a
position. Data on assistant professors in science and engineering from 1990
till 2001 at 14 United States universities suggest that almost 9% of them
left their positions within the second year.5 The decision of a new faculty
member to leave a position after such a short stay in a university is most likely
the outcome of a bad matching.6 This undesirable outcome for universities
results in further administrative costs and disruption of research and teaching
programmes.
Several possibilities exist to address the problem of large number of appli-
cations per position both in decentralized and centralized systems. One way
to deal with the issue is to introduce auctions or application fees (Bandy-
opadhyay et al., 2013; Damiano and Li, 2007). Such mechanisms could, at
least partially, reveal information about applicants’ preferences, and unnec-
essary applications would be avoided. Another possibility is to introduce a
4https://editorialexpress.com/hh/2013.html.
5Computations are performed using the data by Kaminski and Geisler (2012) for a
cohort of 1594 assistant professors.
6In addition to bad matching other reasons or unforeseen circumstances could explain
the departure of a new faculty member. However, the percentage is still surprisingly
high. Also, the number of assistant professors unsatisﬁed with their jobs is at a high level
(National Study of Postsecondary Faculty, 1999 and 2004).
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signaling device to improve the matching outcomes. For example, this mech-
anism has been developed by the American Economic Association Ad Hoc
Committee in the labor market for new economists.
Since 2006, Ph.D. candidates can send a signal about their special inter-
est to up to two universities. Using job market data from the 2006-2009,
Coles et al. (2010a) ﬁnd that this device has been eﬀective in increasing the
probability of receiving an interview.7
In addition, in centralized admission processes, in contrast to decentral-
ized markets, there is the possibility of limiting the number of applications an
applicant can send. In this way, the number of applications which have to be
reviewed per position can be eﬀectively decreased. Furthermore, such a limit
would force applicants to select carefully which positions to apply to, which
means that the application itself would convey information on the applicants’
preferences. Several examples are available in Europe. For instance, in the
French academic job market, universities could rank only 5 candidates per
position until the year of 2009. In Germany, the SfH supports German uni-
versities in the allocation of undergraduates to university places for Medicine
and Pharmacy. The introduction of this system was necessary as the number
of students have increased steadily. In the ﬁrst stage of the process, students
can submit a list of 6 universities.8
Motivated by these markets, we consider the problem of Ph.D job market
from a central planner’s perspective and we study the trade-oﬀ which arises
when we exogenously limit the number of applications (truncation). In the
present paper, we consider the eﬀects of truncation on both sides of the
market (Ph.Ds and universities) and we derive the optimal level of possible
applications accounting for the strategic responses of Ph.Ds facing a limited
number of universities to which they are allowed to apply.
The matching problem under consideration is similar to the marriage mar-
ket which was analyzed in the seminal paper by Gale and Shapley (1962).
They study a pairwise matching mechanism and derive the equilibrium as a
stable matching which occurs when no couples would broke up and formed
new matches which would make them better oﬀ. In our analysis, using the
7Nonetheless, there may still be students and universities unmatched, and thus a fur-
ther device has been introduced: the scramble markets. This secondary market facilitates
the exchange of information regarding unﬁlled positions and Ph.D. candidates looking for
a position in the late spring of every year.
8Students are then matched according to their ﬁnal grade at school.
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Gale and Shapley matching mechanism, we derive the optimal truncation
level in the number of applications. When all candidates submit an exoge-
nously restricted number of applications, some of them will be unmatched,
but, at the same time, other graduates will obtain a better match compared
to the alternative of submitting a full list. Therefore, the optimal level of
restriction of the number of applications is determined in order to improve
the overall matching outcome and, at the same time, the risk of unmatched
candidates is minimized.9
However, when the number of applications is exogenously limited and
the preferences among Ph.Ds are correlated, graduates might use diﬀerent
strategies and misrepresent their preferences.10 Misrepresentation of prefer-
ences is equivalent to graduates not applying to their most preferred posi-
tions (including the inferior “safe option”), which reduces the risk of being
unmatched. In general, the optimal response strategy will depend on the
truncation level and the correlation in the graduates’ preferences. We an-
alyze the ineﬃciency of the matching outcomes, and how it changes with
diﬀerent level of truncation. Using the simulation results, we are able to
show that the aggregate level of matching ineﬃciency for Ph.D. graduates
can be decreased if a limit on the number of applications is imposed. An
optimal restriction on the number of applications p∗ exists, and it increases
as the graduates’ preferences become more correlated. In particular, social
planner should not restrict the number of applications too much if grad-
uates have very correlated preferences. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the optimal
level of truncation and the resulting strategic responses vary with the market
features, such as number of available positions and preferences correlation.
While Ph.D. graduates gain from the introduction of this restriction, univer-
sities experience greater ineﬃciency, although our framework does not take
the direct and indirect costs of processing a large number of applications into
account.11 Altogether, universities may also beneﬁt from imposing a limit
9In this paper, we emphasize the beneﬁts of this truncation in a centralized setting;
however, even in a partially decentralized system, truncation might be beneﬁcial (i.e.,
when it has a signaling value, an optimal truncation level will emerge endogenously under
particular conditions).
10Misrepresentation of preferences was already considered by Roth (1982), who states
that no matching mechanism which can ensure no misrepresentation of preferences exists.
11Such costs of making an oﬀer are present in the academic job market. According to the
data from the 1995-1996 survey, average costs for visiting the AEA conference by the de-
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on the number of possible applications.
Overall, this paper suggests a direction to improve the matching market
of Ph.D. candidates and contain the ineﬃciency which arises from the fea-
tures of many matching markets such as incomplete information, large size
and the high costs of initial screening. While our setting ﬁts the matching
problem between universities and Ph.D. graduates well, it might be general-
ized to other markets. Implementation and policy considerations might diﬀer
depending on the speciﬁcities of the context and will be the object of fur-
ther studies. In addition, our paper shows a desirable property of matching
markets with a limited number of applications. When universities are the
proposing side of the market and candidates apply to all possible positions,
employers minimize their ineﬃciency at the expense of the Ph.D. gradu-
ates; in contrast, when Ph.D. graduates propose, their ineﬃciency would be
minimized at the expenses of the universities. Our results show that, by
introducing the “right” limit on the number of applications, a more even
distribution of ineﬃciency between the two sides of the market is achieved.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the
previous literature. Section 3 formally presents our setting. Section 4 shows
the main results, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Related Literature
Roth (1982) was the ﬁrst paper to ask to what extent the matching pro-
cedures provide participants with incentives to report their ranking of the
available alternatives honestly.12 With a set of theorems, the author is able
to show that there exists no stable matching procedure for which truthful rev-
elation of preferences is a dominant strategy for all participants (impossibility
partment were over $1800, and the costs of campus interview were over $650 per candidate
(Stock et al., 2000). Recent estimates of the campus visit costs are up to $2500, depending
on where the campus is located (Claire Potter, “The Job Market Is A Lot Like The PBS
News Hour, And Other Advice For Skype Interviews”, Tenured Radical (Blog), November
28, 2010, (11:16 pm), http://chronicle.com/blognetwork/tenuredradical/2010/11/why-
job-market-is-lot-like-pbs-newshour/).
12The matching procedure for which any agent can do no better than state his true
preferences is called strategy-proof.
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theorem). Further, if there exists a stable matching procedure which delivers
an optimal matching outcome for one side of the market, truthful revelation
of preferences is the dominant strategy for that side of the market. And
also, the other side of the market does not have incentives to misrepresent
their most preferred alternative, but might beneﬁt from misrepresenting the
other alternatives. As an example, consider the men-proposing Gale-Shapley
algorithm. This mechanism will always deliver stable optimal allocation for
men. According to Roth (1982), it is a dominant strategy for every man
to reveal his true preferences, and it is not, in general, a dominant strategy
for every woman to state her true preferences, except for her most preferred
alternative.
To summarize, the impossibility theorem states that there does not exist
a stable matching procedure which never gives any participant incentives to
misrepresent his/her choice #k , where k = 1. This means that the Gale and
Shapley matching algorithm is not strategy-proof for the accepting side of
the market.
Despite the fact that honest representation of the preferences is not a
dominant strategy, the literature ﬁnds it very complicated to provide market
participants with advice on what the optimal misrepresentation strategy is.
The paper by Roth and Rothblum (1999) considers the problem of which
optimal strategies can be suggested to the market participants. The authors
show that, in order to determine correctly the set of proﬁtable deviations from
stating preferences truthfully, participants have to know the preferences of
both sides of the market perfectly. This amount of information is very rarely
available to the participants. However, authors are also able to show that, in
situations in which a participant has no information about the preferences of
the others, it is still possible to ﬁnd proﬁtable deviation strategies (deviation
from truthfully stating their preferences). These deviation strategies are
very special, because they require a shortening of the list of the preferred
alternatives without changing the order of those alternatives which remain on
the shorter list, and are called truncation strategies.13 For the total number
13Let us consider the participant on the accepting side of the market. An important
requirement for the optimal truncation strategy of a person is that his preferences are
symmetric with respect to the proposing side of the market: each participant on the
accepting side has strict preferences over the alternatives i ∈ 1..N , but he cannot say
which of the participants on the proposing side of the market is likely to prefer him
more, and also which of those alternatives i ∈ 1..N is preferred by the participants on the
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of alternatives N on the list, this truncation strategy requires the listing of
only the top p alternatives. In the context of matching Ph.D. graduates with
academic positions, this corresponds to demand of the Ph.D. graduates to
send applications to p positions out of N listed job positions. Therefore, we
will refer to truncation strategies as the strategies according to which the
graduates are sending p < N applications. As a result, each graduate can
receive oﬀers from, at most, p universities.
The intuition regarding why the truncation of the preference list might be
beneﬁcial is the following: submitting a shortened preference list decreases
the probability of being matched with a less favored alternative. In fact, once
the less favorable alternative is removed from the list, there is zero probability
of being matched with it. But simultaneously, submitting a shorter prefer-
ence list increases the risk of being unmatched. As a result, participants
are likely to use truncation strategies which will increase their probability
of being matched. Balancing these two eﬀects will give the optimal trunca-
tion strategy. Roth and Rothblum (1999) propose the following approach to
determine the gains from truncation strategies by the participant i:
(1) compute the matching outcome for all possible preference proﬁles of
other players (player i does not know the preferences of others, but can have
some expectation about them);
(2) compute in each matching outcome gains or losses compared to the
situation with no truncation;
(3) check for the expected gain, assuming that all realizations of prefer-
ence proﬁles are, for example, equally likely from the point of view of player
i.
This approach was used later in the paper by Coles and Shorrer (2013).
In large markets, it is not possible to obtain matching outcomes for all the
possible matching proﬁle realizations, therefore authors assume that each
participant has no information about the preferences of others, and calculate
the expected utility gain from truncation by iterating Gale-Shapley algorithm
100,000 times and averaging the gains so that the “expected” gain is obtained.
Moreover, the paper also ﬁnds symmetric truncation equilibrium: the more
others truncate, the less an individual participant should truncate (optimal
accepting side of the market.
In general, uncorrelated preferences among the accepting side of the market, and cor-
related preferences among the proposing side of the market satisfy the requirement of
symmetric preferences.
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response), and in this way the equilibrium truncation point is determined
numerically. To illustrate this for the market size N = 30 and uncorrelated
preferences, the symmetric truncation equilibrium requires about a 50% drop
of the preference list by every market participant on the accepting side of
the market.
A new direction in the matching literature considers the idea that ap-
plying itself could be a signal of preferences. This approach has a similar
motivation to ours: matching markets are too congested and market partic-
ipants would beneﬁt if they could credibly signal their preferences over the
alternatives. Signaling of preferences was studied in few recent theoretical
works (Coles et al., 2013b; Lee and Schwarz, 2007; Avery and Levin, 2010).
In those models, the participants of the accepting side of the matching mar-
ket have incentives to signal their preferences over the alternatives and this
signaling increases the welfare of the accepting side of the market and can
increase the total welfare. It is possible to draw some parallels between sig-
naling of preferences and preference truncation by the participants on the
accepting side of the market. If participants submit truncated lists of prefer-
ences, the proposing side of the market will infer that the alternatives which
remain in the truncated list are probably of higher value for the accepting
side participants, and those which are dropped, are valued less.14
As mentioned above, theoretically, searching for the optimal strategies in
the matching markets is very complicated. Therefore, substantial research
was developed in the direction of showing what the optimal deviations from
stating preferences truthfully look like in the experimental setup, or using real
matching data. Both experimental and empirical data suggest that, whenever
the participants are restricted from submitting their full list of preferences,
there is a manipulation of preferences, in the sense that the top p choices are
not included in the list.
Calsamiglia et al. (2010) ﬁnd that Gale-Shapley mechanism is not superior
to the Boston mechanisms in cases of constraints. The reason is that individ-
uals behave strategically, listing schools in which they are most likely to be
accepted, and not necessarily the ones which are ranked highest. Klijn et al.
(2013) consider the school choices with restricted number of submissions un-
der Gale-Shapley and Boston mechanisms, looking also at risk aversion and
14Given that the equilibrium truncation strategy requires the participants to submit
their p top ranked alternatives truthfully.
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preference intensities. They ﬁnd that high risk averse individuals play a pro-
tective strategy particularly in the Gale-Shapley constrained mechanism.15
Once the participants were required to truncate their preference list, the pro-
portion of the cases in which the preferences were manipulated was higher
than 75%. Chen and Sonmez (2006) conduct an experiment in which a cer-
tain number of students with heterogeneous preferences have to be allocated
to schools. The experiment shows that not all students reveal their true pref-
erences but act strategically even in a setting with no restrictions regarding
the length of the preferences list. Other matching mechanisms have been
proved to be more prone to manipulation. For example, Pathak and Sonmez
(2013) compare diﬀerent matching mechanisms based on the extension to
which those are manipulable.
One of the papers which uses the data from real matching markets is
Haeringer et al. (2010) who investigate the French academic job market of
Ph.D.s in mathematics. In this market, candidates are shortlisted and inter-
viewed, then the recruiting committees can rank only ﬁve candidates. Inter-
estingly, they ﬁnd that the matching quality in the non-competitive market
depends on the degree of competitiveness across departments in a given year.
Using the data from the centralized German system for the allocation of uni-
versity places (former ZVS), Braun et al. (2010) show that agents do not
state their true preferences but rather decide to submit a ranking which
would lead to their individual best outcome. The authors were able to illus-
trate this on empirical data (via indirect measures for strategic behavior) for
the application and acceptance process. This allocation of university places
constitutes a priority matching game in which it is known that revealing true
preferences is not a dominant strategy. Students are not allowed to state
more than 6 preferences, and, since the ZVS reveals statistics about the ac-
ceptance process, the students can thus learn about their chances and behave
accordingly.
In this paper, we build on the previous works that consider preference list
truncation to improve match eﬃciency in Gale-Shapley algorithm (Roth and
Rothblum, 1999; Coles and Shorrer, 2013). Our analysis contributes to the
existing literature by quantifying this match improvement, with regard to
diﬀerent structures of preferences and the level of truncation. Our approach
15Participants had 3 alternatives, but were constrained to submit the ranking which
includes only 2 alternatives.
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is diﬀerent from Coles and Shorrer (2013), we characterize and evaluate the
optimal level of exogenous preference truncation level. In addition, we ad-
dress the problem of strategic preference manipulation under this restricted
preference reporting mechanism. Even though we are not able to solve for the
equilibrium best response strategy, we describe the broad class of manipula-
tion strategies, which lead to further improvement of the match quality under
preference truncation. We also quantify the eﬀect of applying manipulation
strategies by participants.
3. Background
Let the matching game be deﬁned by {G,U, q, wg, wu}, where G is the set
of Ph.D. graduates and U is a set of universities. It holds |G| = |U | = N .16
Thus, we have both N Ph.D. graduates, g1, g2, ..., gN and N universities,
u1, u2, .., uN . q is the capacity vector which describes the number of positions
each university has to ﬁll. In our case, we consider q = (1, ..., 1)′, q ∈ 1×N .
Thus, every university has 1 position to allocate. The game can easily be
generalized to |ql| ≥ 1, l = 1, ..., N .
Let wg be the matrix which contains the preferences of all Ph.D. gradu-
ates:
wg :=
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
ug1,1 ug1,2 ... ug1,N
ug2,1 ug2,2 ... ug2,N
... ... ... ...
ugN ,1 ugN ,2 ... ug1,N
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ (1)
Thus, the i-th row states the preferences of Ph.D. graduate gi given by ugi :
(ugi,1, ugi,2, ..., ugi,N), which consists of the N universities ugi,j, j = 1, ..., N ,
ordered according to his strict preferences, such that wgi(ugi,1) > wgi(ugi,2) >
... > wgi(ugi,N), where wgi(ugi,j) is the utility the graduate gi obtains from
being matched with university position ugi,j.
For example, assume that N = 3 and that Ph.D. graduate g1 has the
preference list ug1 : (u2, u3, u1), such that wg1(u2) > wg1(u3) > wg1(u1). It
means that the utility for graduate g1 is the highest when he is matched with
university u2, and he will gain the third highest utility from being matched
with university u1. We also assume that graduates always rank the possibility
16We restrict our simulations to this case for now, but will relax this assumption in
future simulations.
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of being unmatched as the worst possible outcome. We say that a Ph.D. is
unmatched, when he is matched with university u0.
The preferences of the universities wu over the set of Ph.D. students are
deﬁned accordingly:
wu :=
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
gu1,1 gu1,2 ... gu1,N
gu2,1 gu2,2 ... gu2,N
... ... ... ...
guN ,1 guN ,2 ... gu1,N
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
The preferences of university uj are given in the j−th row. The expression
g0 will deﬁne that the university could not ﬁll its position (is unmatched).
To generate the matrix wg of potentially correlated preferences among the
graduates, we adopt a method initially suggested by Caldarelli and Capocci
(2001). Thus, the preference of each Ph.D. graduate for a university uj is
composed of an individual opinion, which can diﬀer from graduate to gradu-
ate, and a common opinion by all graduates. In this way, we allow preferences
to be, in part, individual, for example, if a graduate prefers a certain univer-
sity because it is close to his home town. The common part of preferences
is induced by objective measures (for example, university rankings), which
are visible to all graduates. Formally, each graduate gi assigns a score Sgiu
to each university, according to the following equation:
Sgiu = εgiu + VgJu (2)
Both the entries of the vector εgiu and the entries of vector Ju are uniformly
drawn from [0, 1]. Vector εgiu represents the individual opinion, and vector
Ju the common view of the graduates on universities. Thus, Ju remains the
same in all the scores for graduates. The constant parameter Vg, Vg ∈ [0,∞),
measures the level of correlation of the graduates’ preferences. The larger Vg,
the more alike the preferences of graduates, where Vg deﬁnes no correlation.
In the same way, we generate the vector of preferences of each university
uj over the set of graduates:
Sujg = εujg + VuJg (3)
where we allow the correlation parameters Vg and Vu to diﬀer.
Note that we need at least cardinal-scaled preferences as our measure for
ineﬃciency relies on the fact that we can interpret the distance between the
11
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most preferred choice and the actual match. Thus, ordinal-scaled preferences
would not be enough. Moreover, we will later exploit the special characteris-
tic of this score - the ability to distinguish between individual and common
opinion - by proposing a smart way of optimal response to truncation.
To illustrate the calculation of the score Sgiu with an example, consider
the case of two university positions u1 and u2, and two Ph.D. graduates,
g1 and g2. Let Ju = (0.2, 0.3)
′, which means that the joint preference of
the graduates towards university u1 is 0.2, and 0.3 towards university u2.
The individual preference of Ph.D. graduate g1 is εg1u = (0.5, 0.1)
′ and of
Ph.D. graduate εg2u = (0.1, 0.4)
′. Then, Sg1u = (0.5, 0.1)
′ + Vg(0.2, 0.3)′ and
Sg2u = (0.1, 0.4)
′ + Vg(0.2, 0.3)′. For Vg = 2, we would have Sg1u = (0.9, 0.7)
′
and Sg2u = (0.5, 1)
′, and the preference lists would be: ug1 : (u1, u2) and
ug2 : (u2, u1). And the preference matrix of universities is:
wu :=
(
u1 u2
u2 u1
)
The outcome of the matching algorithm is the pairing of Ph.D. graduates
and universities. We deﬁne this pairing by the mapping m : G → U . For
every Ph.D. graduate gi, this mapping m will deﬁne the university uj he is
matched with. If Ph.D. graduate g1 is matched with university position u3,
we would have m(g1) = u3. If a Ph.D. graduate g1 is unmatched, we have
m(g1) = u0.
We can also deﬁne the matching from the university perspective. Then,
we have a mapping n : U → G. For this case, we have n(u3) = g1, when
university u3 is matched with g1. In the case that the university could not
ﬁll its position, we have n(u3) = g0.
It will be useful to deﬁne the set of stable matchings. The matching
outcome m(G) ⊂ U is stable if there is no blocking pair. Ablocking pair
is a graduate gi and university uj, not currently matched to one another,
who would prefer to be matched with each other, rather than being matched
with their current matches in m(G) ⊂ U (Roth and Rothblum, 1999).17 In
general, there can exist more that one stable matching outcome for the given
preferences wg and wu. The set of stable matching outcomes is also called the
core. Further, we deﬁne a university uj as achievable for a Ph.D. gi, if there
exists a stable matching in which m(gi) = uj (Coles and Shorrer, 2013).
17Note, that the “current match” could be also m(gi) = u0, and, in this case, graduate
gi prefers to be matched to uj rather than be unmatched.
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3.1. Gale-Shapley mechanism
The most popular mechanism which produces stable matches is the Gale-
Shapley mechanism (also called the Deferred-Acceptance algorithm) (Gale
and Shapley, 1962). The algorithm ﬁnds a stable match between two sets
of elements (usually referred to as “men” and women”), which have certain
preferences over the elements in the opposite set.
Suppose that graduates and universities submit their preferences to a so-
cial planner. Matching outcomes m are obtained by using a “centralized”
authority, where participants submit their their preferences {wg, wu}, and
the centralized authority applies the Deferred-Acceptance algorithm to de-
termine the matches. The algorithm is stated as if the market was decen-
tralized: universities are making oﬀers and graduates are accepting positions
according to their preferences, but they are not submitting those preferences
to the centralized authority. This emphasizes that the Deferred-Acceptance
algorithm resembles a decentralized market for obtaining matches.
The algorithm works as following:
At the beginning, all graduates and universities are not matched (“free”).
Round 1. From the amount of applications it has received, each university
uj proposes to its favorite graduate gi. Each graduate gi retains his most
favorite university position (from the universities which made him an oﬀer),
if any, and rejects all other positions which have proposed to him (in the case
that he receives more than one proposal).
Round 2. All rejected universities in the ﬁrst round propose to their sec-
ond best option. Then, each graduate chooses from the pool of new proposers
and the position he keeps from Round 1. All other oﬀers are rejected.
The algorithm stops when there are no more proposals left.
Gale and Shapley (1962) demonstrate formally that this mechanism leads
to a stable matching outcome for any preference proﬁles.
3.2. Ineﬃciency of the matching outcome
The ineﬃciency of the matching outcome m(G) is measured by a function
of the distance of the realized match to the most preferred choice, where we
also account for the speciﬁc position preference of the participants.18 The
18A similar speciﬁcation has been used in the previous literature (e.g., Coles and
Shorrer, 2013).
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ineﬃciency for graduate gi, i = 1, ..., N, resulting from his matching outcome
m(gi) is given by:
ϑ(gi) =
{
1, if m(gi) = u0(
rkg(m(gi))−1
N
)ag
, otherwise
(4)
with ϑ : G → R.
The function rkg : G → R is a function which returns the rank. Rank
is the number which refers to the ”position” of the match m(gi) = uj in
the vector ugi . For example, if graduate gi is matched with his third best
choice uj3 , rkg(m(gi)) = 3. Thus, the more his match deviates from his
most preferred choice, the higher his ineﬃciency ϑ(gi) is. Precisely, the inef-
ﬁciency of the match increases monotonically by (1/N)ag . Being unmatched
is treated as being matched with your N + 1 preferred option. The param-
eter ag characterizes the curvature of the ineﬃciency function. We can refer
to this ineﬃciency measure ϑ(gi) as “dis-utility” of the match for the grad-
uate gi. Then, if ag > 1, graduate gi has increasing marginal “dis-utility”
of the match. Figure 1 below plots this ineﬃciency function for parameter
ag > 1. As we can see, moving from 6th most preferred choice to 7th most
preferred choice increases ineﬃciency of the match much more than moving
from choice ranked 5 to choice ranked 6. Interpretation is the following: for
ag > 1 graduates value the possibility of obtaining a better match less than
the loss of eﬃciency if they obtain a worse match. The situation for ag < 1
is the opposite: graduates value the possibility of obtaining a better match
more than the loss of eﬃciency if they obtain a worse match.
Similarly, the ineﬃciency of the universities is deﬁned by:
η(ui) =
{
1, if n(uj) = g0(
rku(m(uj))−1
N
)au
, otherwise
(5)
with η : U → R. The function rku : U → R gives the rank of the student
to which the university is matched. We allow ag and au to diﬀer from each
other.
4. Results
4.1. Exogenously truncated preferences and match ineﬃciency - theoretical
results
Using the notation, for p ∈ (0, N ], we deﬁne the preference list wpg which
includes only gi’s p most preferred university positions (ordered according
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to the true preferences wg). We call this p-truncation of the graduates’ true
preferences. Therefore, wpg is the part of the matrix wg, which included
only ﬁrst p columns. We set level p as exogenously given, imposed by the
central planner. In other words, every graduate is constrained to apply to a
maximum of p positions. At this stage, we assume that the graduates apply
to their top p preferred positions, and estimate the aggregate ineﬃciency
from matching outcomes.
Later, we will discuss the possibility of strategic behavior in this frame-
work and will show that the strategic responses of the graduates can only
decrease the ineﬃciency level compared to the setup with no strategic re-
sponses. In other words, the optimal level of truncation remains robust to
the strategic responses of the graduates. Moreover, this is the most conser-
vative truncation level, in the sense that it provides optimal truncation level
under the “worst-case” scenario.
Building on the literature of Roth and Rothblum (1999) and Coles and
Shorrer (2013), truncation can only be proﬁtable strategy for the “accept-
ing” side (in our case, the graduates) of the market. The beneﬁt derives
from the increased probability of being matched with a more preferred uni-
versity. However, submitting a shorter preference list increases the risk of
being unmatched.
Below, we will demonstrate with a simple example how truncation of the
individual preference list can make some participants better oﬀ. Consider
a matching game with N = 3. The table below presents the preferences of
graduates and universities:19
Preferences and matching outcomes (without truncation)
w(g1) = {u1 u3 u2} w(u1) = {g1 g3 g2}
w(g2) = {u2 u1 u3} w(u2) = {g3 g1 g2}
w(g3) = {u1 u3 u2} w(u3) = {g1 g2 g3}
Preferences and matching outcomes (with truncation)
w(g1) = {u1 u3 u2} w(u1) = {g1 g3 g2}
w(g2) = {u2 u1 } w(u2) = {g3 g1 g2}
w(g3) = {u1 u3 u2} w(u3) = {g1 g2 g3}
19Bold symbols in the matrix refer to the matching outcome of the Gale-Shapley algo-
rithm.
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Using the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm, we obtain matching outcome
{m(g1) = u1;m(g2) = u3;m(g3) = u2}. Graduate g1 is matched with his most
preferred university. The other two graduates are matched with their least
preferred universities. If graduate g2 decides to truncate his preference list
to include only his two most preferred positions, such that wg2 = {u2, u1},
the resulting matching outcome is: {m(g1) = u1;m(g2) = u2;m(g3) = u3}.
Note that not only does graduate g2 beneﬁt from the truncation (he is now
matched with his most preferred university), but also graduate g3. Also,
universities are paired with worse options than before the truncation.20
In the next example, we change the preferences such that graduate g3 now
prefers university u2 over university u3. The matching outcome is {m(g1) =
u1;m(g2) = u3;m(g3) = u2}. If g2 excludes u3 from his preference list, the
resulting matching is {m(g1) = u1;m(g2) = u0;m(g3) = u2}. Therefore, as a
result of truncation graduate g2 is unmatched.
Preferences and matching outcomes (without truncation)
w(g1) = {u1 u3 u2} w(u1) = {g1 g3 g2}
w(g2) = {u2 u1 u3} w(u2) = {g3 g1 g2}
w(g3) = {u1 u2 u3} w(u3) = {g1 g2 g3}
Preferences and matching outcomes (with truncation)
w(g1) = {u1 u3 u2} w(u1) = {g1 g3 g2}
w(g2) = {u2 u1 } w(u2) = {g3 g1 g2}
w(g3) = {u1 u2 u3} w(u3) = {g1 g2 g3}
Coles and Shorrer (2013) deﬁne symmetric equilibrium in truncation level,
such that there exists a symmetric equilibrium level p˜ that every man reports
true preferences and every woman uses a symmetric truncation strategy σ(p˜),
in other words, all submit a list of the length p˜ (of true preferences). In con-
trast to Coles and Shorrer (2013), our approach will be to consider eﬃciency
gains and losses from simultaneous preference list truncation by all partic-
ipants on the “accepting” side of this market (the graduates). That is, we
calculate the ex-ante (expected) ineﬃciency of the matching outcomes (cal-
culated via the function ϑ and η). The overall market ineﬃciency is given
20This is true because the initial matching outcome (without truncation) was optimal
for the universities, in the sense that any other stable matching outcome will make at least
one of the universities worse oﬀ.
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by the sum over the ineﬃciencies of all market participants. We investigate
the aggregate match ineﬃciency for diﬀerent truncation levels p. We are able
to show numerically that there exists a level of truncation p∗ which delivers
the lowest ineﬃciency for all the participants on the “accepting” side of the
market as:
p∗ = argmin
p
E
wg ,wu
( ∑
i=1,...,N
ϑgi(m[w
p
gi
, wpg−i , wu](gi))
)
, (6)
where m[wpgi , w
p
g−i , wu](gi) is the matching outcome for the graduate gi given
the other graduates’ submitted truncated lists wpg−i , and university prefer-
ences wu.
Theorem 1. There is no p∗ such that p∗ > p˜.
Proof. Suppose there is a p∗ that is minimizing the total ineﬃciency of
the matching outcome of the graduates, and that p∗ > p˜. Then, if all grad-
uates are truncating in equilibrium at p˜, the optimal response of at least
one graduate gj would be to choose a longer preference list, and to send
p > p˜ applications. But then p˜ is not an equilibrium truncation level. By
contradiction, it cannot be that p∗ > p˜.
Below we show with numerical simulations that p∗ is lower than the sym-
metric equilibrium truncation level described in Coles and Shorrer (2013).
However, with this truncation level p∗, the participants of the ”accepting”
side of the market are free to choose to which positions to apply. This means
that the optimal strategy of the graduates is not necessarily to include top p
choices in the preference list. We will return to the issue of optimal responses
of the graduates below.
4.2. Exogenously truncated preferences and match ineﬃciency - numerical
simulations
For the numerical simulation, we use the Gale-Shapley algorithm, where
universities propose to graduates. There are 5 model parameters, which can
be changed. We assume that our market consists of 100 universities and 100
graduates. Each university has 1 position to be ﬁlled. The parameters Vg
and Vu deﬁne the degree of correlation in the preferences. At the beginning,
we assume Vg = Vu = 0, which means that both universities and graduates
preferences are uncorrelated. The parameters for the ineﬃciency function are
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set to ag = au = 1. Consequently, they treat the step from being matched
with their second choice to being matched with their third choice in the same
way as, for example, the step from being matched with the least preferred
university/graduate to being unmatched.
We consider all possible truncation levels, ranging from 1 (applying to
most preferred position only) to 100 (applying to all positions, no truncation).
For now, we assume that students reveal their preferences truthfully, in the
sense that they apply to top p most preferred positions.
As preferences are randomly chosen, we cannot simulate the matching
procedure just once. In order to have meaningful results, we repeat each
simulation 1,000 times and average the obtained results for match ineﬃciency.
The Gale-Shapley algorithm is modiﬁed in the following way: at the
beginning, all graduates and universities are unmatched (“free”). Graduates
retain only p most preferred universities in their preference list. This is
the same as if graduates were applying to their p most preferred universities
only. Universities can still rank all graduates, but can make oﬀers only to the
graduates who have applied to them. Therefore, phrase “apply to university
position uj” used in this paper characterizes the situation when the graduate
retains university uj in his (truncated) preference list.
Round 1. Each university uj oﬀers to the most preferred graduate gi,
which has applied to it. Each graduate gi accepts his most favorite university
position (from the universities which have made him an oﬀer), if any, and
rejects all other positions which have proposed to him (in the case that he
receives more than one proposal).
Round 2. All rejected universities in the ﬁrst round propose to their sec-
ond best option. Then, each graduate chooses from the pool of new proposers
and the position he keeps from Round 1. All other oﬀers are rejected.
The algorithm ends, when there are no more universities which can still
make oﬀers to some graduates.
Figure 2 shows the obtained ineﬃciency, separately for the proposing
side (universities) and accepting side (graduates) for the diﬀerent level of
truncation p. When the graduates submit their full lists of preferences (p =
100), all positions are ﬁlled (Gale-Shapley algorithm matches all participants,
in case of submitting full preference lists). Nevertheless, the ineﬃciency for
graduates (blue bars) is at its highest level: this is because some graduates
have a rather poor match. In fact, as soon as they start to apply to less
than N positions, they beneﬁt: the ineﬃciency decreases monotonically up
to a truncation point of around 16 (meaning that they have applied to their
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16 most preferred universities). However, as soon as they submit even less
applications, ineﬃciency increases sharply. The reason for this increase can
be seen from Figure 4 (V = 0, which mean that Vg = Vu = 0): severe
truncation results in a high number of unmatched participants. In fact, the
number of non-ﬁlled position rises up to 23 (for total of 100 positions) for
p = 1.
p = 1 implies that students apply just to their most preferred university
and many universities will not receive any applications. In turn, many stu-
dents compete for the same position. Nevertheless, we also see from Figure
4 that the problem of unﬁlled positions is not that severe for the optimal
truncation point of 16, just 2 graduates are unmatched.21
To summarize, graduates face a trade-oﬀ: they gain from limiting the
number of applications by obtaining a better match. But with a lower number
of applications (more truncation), they face a higher risk of being unmatched.
The optimal number of applications, p∗, is substantially lower than p = N ,
where the latter refers to applying to all universities.
Regarding the universities, it is clear that they cannot beneﬁt from grad-
uates’ truncation, as less graduates apply to them. Thus, there will always
be some universities which are either unmatched or are matched to a less pre-
ferred graduate, when students truncate their list. For the proposing side,
the best solution is always to have access to the full list of preferences (see
Roth, 1982; Roth and Rothblum, 1999).
We then consider the case in which M < N , as a prevailing feature
of many real-world contexts, meaning that there are more candidates than
available positions. Importantly, we ﬁnd that decreasing the number of avail-
able positions M the optimal truncation level p∗ decreases. However, when
M < N the aggregate ineﬃciency is higher than the case M = N , no matter
what the number of applications is allowed. Also, when the number of avail-
able positions is substantially lower than the pool of candidates M << N ,
changing the truncation level p has almost no eﬀect on the aggregate ineﬃ-
ciency level. Therefore, the decrease in the ineﬃciency for Ph.D. graduates
under p∗ is low; and in particular when M = 1, implementing any truncation
21Notice the importance of the utility function deﬁned above. If we assign less in-
eﬃciency to the unmatched outcomes (now, we set the ineﬃciency to 1), the optimal
truncation point in terms of ineﬃciency moves to the left. When we assign more ineﬃ-
ciency to the unmatched outcomes, the optimum moves to the right. We will come back
to this point relating to the form of the utility function later.
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level does not aﬀect the ﬁnal outcome.
Next, we study the eﬀect of preference correlation. High correlation
means that students agree with respect to which are the best universities.
Consequently, under high correlation (with large V ), many students will
apply to few universities and many universities will prefer few students, re-
spectively. Intuitively, exogenous truncation of the preference list will be
more costly now, because graduate are more likely to retain the same uni-
versities in their truncated preference lists, competition for the positions will
be higher, and graduates are more likely to remain unmatched.
Figure 3 shows the ﬁndings for diﬀerent V (Vg = Vu = V ) and a. Let us
ﬁrst consider the case where a = ag = au = 1 (middle ﬁgure). As expected,
ineﬃciency is the lowest under no preference correlation (V = 0). Indeed,
in this case, graduates and universities are likely to diﬀer substantially in
their preferences. Thus, many students will receive an oﬀer from their most
preferred university. By increasing V , match ineﬃciency becomes higher.
Regarding the optimal truncation point, we see that, for mild correlation
V = 0.5, the social planner should choose a truncation point around 35. For
even higher V , the optimal truncation point moves further to the right, where
the ineﬃciency remains nearly constant from p = 70 (V = 1.5) and is at its
lowest for p = 100 (submit full ranking), when V = 5. The reason is that
graduates are likely to end up unmatched under extreme correlation. This
can be seen also from Figure 4, which states the number of unﬁlled positions
depending on p. When V is high, the number of unﬁlled positions is positive
already starting from p = 99 and ends with around 90 unﬁlled positions,
when p = 1. We also see that the unﬁlled positions arise nearly exclusively
from missing applications and not from the fact that all graduates reject
the oﬀer from the university to which they have applied. For V = 0 (no
correlation), we have the opposite case: in addition to the fact that there are
only a few unﬁlled positions, those unﬁlled positions are mainly the result of
rejection by the applicant, and not the result of no applications.
To summarize, for ﬁxed truncation point p and the increase in the corre-
lation of preferences, the number of unﬁlled positions considerably increases,
as an increasing number of graduates apply to the same few universities and
many universities do not even receive an application. As a result, for highly
correlated preferences, it is no longer optimal for the social planner to enforce
a truncation in the number of applications.
The ﬁndings are also likely to change, when just the preferences of the
universities are highly correlated (as all universities would like to hire highly
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quality graduates, which can be revealed by objective measures, such as
grades), but Ph.D graduates have less correlated preferences (as they also
have some individual non observable preferences, i.e., have geographical pref-
erences). For the case Vg < Vu, we ﬁnd that, with increasing Vu, the beneﬁts
from truncating are lower.
So far we have considered the case with a = 1, which corresponds to the
ineﬃciency level plotted in the middle of Figure 3. We will now consider
the aggregate ineﬃciency of the realized matches for diﬀerent levels of a.
Figure 3 shows the ﬁndings. Consider ﬁrst two graphs at the top. Graduates
with a < 1 do not care so much whether they could end up unmatched. In
fact, they value an increasing of the rank of their match far more. They
will not beneﬁt from less truncation, although this increases the probability
of being matched. For correlated preferences V = 0, we have an optimal
truncation point (interior). In fact, ineﬃciency remains at the same level,
from a certain truncation point p. Note that the lowest ineﬃciency is not
achieved for p = 1, as even with a < 1 graduates still value a match (even if
not as high as having a good match). Graduates with a > 1 (the two graphs
in the last row) value more the fact that they are matched, no matter whether
the university they are matched with is highly preferred or not. Thus, it is
usually the case that the lowest ineﬃciency is achieved under no truncation
(p = 100), especially if preferences are correlated. However, for uncorrelated
preferences, it is possible to ﬁnd interior optimal truncation point p∗.
4.3. Strategic preference manipulation under exogenous truncation and match
ineﬃciency
As was noted above, the deferred-acceptance algorithm is not strategy-
proof for the accepting side of the market. Therefore, when a maximum
number of application p is exogenously imposed to Ph.D. graduates such that
p < N , they might respond by applying to universities which are not the most
preferred. In case Vg = 0 and Vu = 0, this strategy will never be optimal
(Roth and Rothblum, 1999). Yet, when graduates’ preferences are correlated,
meaning Vg = 0, a graduate i might increase his probability of being matched
well (or being matched at all) by misrepresenting his true preferences. We
restrict our attention to the case when Vu = 0, meaning that universities
preferences over graduates are uncorrelated. Given our speciﬁcation that
a graduate’s preferences identiﬁes by his individual preferences εgiu and a
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common component Ju
Sgiu = εgiu + Vg × Ju,
the only optimal strategy would be to “uncorrelate” his own preferences from
the common preferences of all graduates up to a certain degree. This can
be modeled by putting less weight on Ju (which is weighted by graduates
with Vg/(1+Vg)) and putting more weight on his individual preferences εgiu.
Formally,
Sgiu = (1 + α)εgiu + (Vg − α)× Ju, (7)
with α ∈ [0, Vg]. In this way, the other graduates weight the individual part
by 1/(1 + Vg) and the common part by Vg/(1 + Vg), whereas our optimizing
graduate i gives the weight (1 + α)/(1 + Vg) to his idiosyncratic (individual)
part and (Vg −α)/(1+Vg) to the common part. This is a strategy which de-
creases graduate i’s matching ineﬃciency because, although he is not telling
the truth, he beneﬁts from choosing the universities which are at least indi-
vidually preferred and putting them onto his application list. Imagine, for
example, a graduate who thinks he has no chance of receiving an oﬀer from
Harvard (a university we can assume to be preferred by many students). If
he excludes Harvard from his list of p most preferred university positions
(truncated list of preferences), he is likely to include instead the university
position to which is at least individually highly preferred. This strategy is
smart, as randomly “lying” could result in being matched with a university
which is not preferred by our student at all. Our imposed strategy guarantees
that the probability that a university, which is neither preferred individually
nor commonly, ends up on his application list is quite low.
Intuitively, given a certain p and Vg, the optimal αi will depends on: i)
the realized preferences of individual i, ii) the realized preferences of all other
graduates G \ {i}, and iii) the realized preferences of N universities. This
means that, for each market participants’ realization of preferences, there
exists an αi such that minimizes (reduces) his match ineﬃciency. Similarly,
for all other graduates. For this reason, it is not possible to derive a unique
α∗. Nonetheless, we can evaluate the overall ineﬃciency when individuals
are not truthtelling under diﬀerent truncation levels.
Based on these considerations, we proceed in the following way. We
compare market ineﬃciency for diﬀerent patterns of preference manipulation
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by graduates. We will consider three cases where all graduates choose to
submit a preference lists according to one of the expressions below:
(a) Sgiu = (1 + α
∗
0)εgiu + (Vg − α∗0)× Ju, for ∀ i = 1, ..., N (8)
(b) Sgiu = (1 + α
∗
r)εgiu + (Vg − α∗r)× Ju, for ∀ i = 1, ..., N (9)
(c) Sgiu = (1 + α
∗
Vg)εgiu + (Vg − α∗Vg)× Ju, for ∀ i = 1, ..., N (10)
where α∗0 = 0, α
∗
r is drawn randomly from the set {0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., Vg} and
α∗Vg = Vg. We simulate matching outcomes for diﬀerent truncation level p,
and compute aggregate ineﬃciency for all graduates.
Case (a) with α∗0 corresponds to the situation where graduates do not act
strategically, and apply to their most preferred p positions (act according
to their true preference list); case (c) corresponds to the situation in which
graduates apply to the p positions according to their individual preference
component εgiu only, and case (b) is the intermediate case, where each gradu-
ate randomly chooses α∗r , which aﬀects the selection of the positions to which
he applies.
Figure 6 shows the simulation results for diﬀerent levels of preference
correlation (Vg = 0, Vg = 1 and Vg = 5) and the three cases: (a), (b) and (c).
Consider the case with Vg = 0. In this situation, there is no space for
strategic manipulation of the list of positions where graduates apply - grad-
uates already have uncorrelated preferences. In this situation, optimal trun-
cation level p∗ is between 10 and 20.
Now, for the case where Vg = 1, there is some space for strategic ma-
nipulation. We can see that if graduates do not manipulate their preference
list and apply to their p most preferred position, aggregate match ineﬃ-
ciency is the highest (blue line). On the other hand, if graduates apply to
the top p positions according to their individual preference component εgiu,
aggregate match ineﬃciency decreases considerable (red line). This is an in-
tuitive result, because if every graduate applies according to his individual
preference component, there is no pattern in the applications received by
the universities (applications are uniformly distributed among universities),
and graduates face the lowest level of competition for the position. In this
situation, we obtain the highest level of ﬁlled positions.
However, the match ineﬃciency for Vg = 1 is still higher than for Vg = 0,
even if graduates apply according to their individual preference component.
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This happens because true preferences under Vg = 1 are determined also
by the common component: making application lists less correlated with
other graduates’ lists ensures that the graduate is more likely to be matched,
but this match is still less eﬃcient than the match with true most preferred
position.
Results for the case with Vg = 5 are similar.
(1) To summarize, aggregate ineﬃciency level for the case in which grad-
uates apply to their top p most preferred position provides the upper bound
on the ineﬃciency level which would be achieved under any strategic manip-
ulation of preferences by the graduates.22
(2) In addition, the optimal truncation level p∗ decreases if graduates ma-
nipulate their preferences. For example, for Vg = 1, under assumption that
graduates do not manipulate their preferences at all (α∗0), optimal truncation
is p∗ = 60, but under the assumption that graduates act only according to
their individual component of the preferences (α∗Vg), truncation level should
be set to p∗ = 20. Therefore, optimal truncation level p∗ determined by the
aggregate match ineﬃciency under the assumption of no preference manipu-
lation provides the most conservative truncation level. In fact, whenever the
social planner thinks that graduates would, to some extent, manipulate their
preferences, it is safe to choose even a lower truncation level p < p∗.
5. Conclusion
In the last decades, many real-world markets are crowded as never before,
thus challenging the hiring mechanisms. This paper provides a rationale
for imposing a limit on the number of possible applications in the matching
markets for new Pd.D. graduates. Our results show that, if the social planner
introduces the optimal level of truncation the quality of matches increases
for Pd.D. graduates. From the point of view of universities, the quality of
matches decreases but this loss is oﬀset by the reduction in the hiring costs.
Moreover, the proposed mechanism guarantees a more even distribution of
ineﬃciency between the two sides of the market. While the optimal level
of truncation is derived under speciﬁc parameters, by considering diﬀerent
22By “any strategic manipulation”, we mean any strategic manipulation of a certain
type considered in this paper: remove most commonly preferred positions from the pref-
erence list and substitute them with positions which are individually most preferred.
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features of the market our analysis can provide useful insights also in other
contexts.
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Figure 1: Plot of ineﬃciency measure ϑ, for a > 1. Horizontal axis shows rk, rank
of the match; and vertical axis shows the value of ineﬃciency (dis-utility) for the
match
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Figure 2: Matching Ineﬃciencies for Diﬀerent Level of Truncation. This ﬁgure
shows the aggregated (over all participants) ineﬃciency of the matching outcomes.
We run 1000 simulations, and parameters are set as the following: N = 100,
Vu = Vg = 0 and a = 1.
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Figure 3: Matching Ineﬃciencies for Diﬀerent Level Truncation, Preference Corre-
lation and the Risk Attitude. This ﬁgure shows the aggregated (over all partic-
ipants) ineﬃciency of the matching outcomes for the Ph.D. graduates. We run
1000 simulations, and parameters are set as the following: N = 100.
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Figure 5: Number or Rounds. This ﬁgure shows the maximum number of rounds it
takes to ﬁnalize the matching algorithm, for diﬀerent truncation level and prefer-
ence correlation. We run 1000 simulations, and parameters are set as the following:
N = 100, a = 1.
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Figure 7: Optimal level of alpha. This ﬁgure shows the optimal level of alpha (y-
axis), for low-type, medium-type, high-type and for some truncation levels (P =
1, P = 5, P = 10, P = 20, P = 30, P = 40, P = 50, P = 60, P = 100). We run 100
simulations, and parameters are set as the following: N = 100, Vg = Vu = 1.
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Appendix A. Matching ineﬃciency and other comparative statics
The results of the present paper are based on the aggregate ineﬃciency
both for Ph.D. graduates and universities, and ineﬃciency has been deﬁned
respectively in Equation 4 and Equation 5. This speciﬁcation is consistent
with the previous literature. For example, Coles and Shorrer (2013) use
the same functional form, albeit in terms of eﬃciency. In a similar vein,
Boudreau and Knoblauch (2010) use aggregate satisfaction deﬁned as the sum
of men’s (and women’s) rankings of their assigned mates. Yet, some further
considerations are necessary. First, we choose a functional form which allow
us to consider both the utility for matched and unmatched agents. While, in
the ﬁrst case, it is a measure of distance of the realized match to the most
preferred choice, in the second case, the ineﬃciency is consistently deﬁned
as equal 1. In this way, unmatched outcomes are highly penalized even
though, depending on the agent and on the context, they may be penalized
more or less.23 Also, the proposed measure gives an important role to the
agents’ rank. We believe that distance, rkg(m(gi)) − 1 and rku(m(ui)) − 1,
approximates quite well the heterogeneity in the ineﬃciency obtained by
the possible matching outcomes. In reality, a Ph.D. graduate may care a
lot about the top 25 universities, but be quite indiﬀerent to middle ranked
universities. Someone else may perceive a matching outcome with a lower
ranked university as being very ineﬃcient.24 For this reason, we consider
diﬀerent shapes of the ineﬃciency function, captured by the parameter ag
and au.
Second, in addition to the aggregate ineﬃciency computed both for Ph.D.
graduates and universities, other elements could be considered in a welfare
comparison. For example, if the social planner is concerned about fairness,
he might consider the dispersion of the ineﬃciency for the Ph.D. graduates
(universities). In this case, our results vary in function of ag and Vg (au
and Vu). In addition, it is possible to look at who gains more by truncation.
23Unmatched outcomes are diﬀerent for Ph.D. graduates and universities. Universities
will delay the hiring of an assistant professor to the next year and overcome the teaching
needs with someone else. Ph.D. graduates might opt for post-doc positions and try the
job market again the year after, or they might have good outside options (in another
market). However, this varies substantially year by year depending on external factors
(i.e., economic conditions).
24An analogous reasoning applies to universities.
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We demonstrate that very good universities in particular and highly-qualiﬁed
graduates still beneﬁt from high truncation, even under high correlation level.
Otherwise, the social planner might care about the costs of implementing the
matching mechanism, such as the number of rounds required in order to reach
the stable matching outcome. Importantly, we ﬁnd that limiting the number
of applications would be substantially beneﬁcial for decreasing the number
of rounds as an a stable matching would be reached in a shorter time (see
Figure 5).
Appendix B. Strategic preference manipulation with “types”
It is possible to extend the analysis in the paper to account for the uni-
versities’ preference correlation (Vu > 0). First, we assume that universities
observe objective measures of the quality of graduates (grades, number of
publications, quality of the journals where these articles are published, con-
ference talks, and so on), and, for this reason universities will agree, to some
extent, on their preferences over Ph.D. graduates. Thus, we will distinguish
between three type of graduates. A graduate i can be a very good graduate,
high type gHi , an average graduate, medium type g
M
i , or a not very com-
petitive graduate, low type gLi , where we model the types using universities’
preferences. A very good graduate is modelled by taking the preferences of
the universities
Sujg = εujg + Vu × Jg, for, ∀ j = 1, ..., N
and setting the joint preference factor, Jg, to 0.9. Setting Jg = 0.5 deﬁnes an
average graduate and Jg = 0.1 deﬁnes a graduate who is not preferred much
by universities.
In the simulations below, we consider one graduate, who has a certain
type, and investigate his matching outcome under diﬀerent optimization
strategies. In the simulations we ﬁrst consider one deviating candidate,
which will be of a speciﬁc type (gHi , g
M
i or g
L
i ). We determine his ineﬃ-
ciency via Equation (4) for diﬀerent truncation levels p and diﬀerent level of
preference correlation among graduates, Vg and diﬀerent α. The case α = 0
refers to the truth-telling, where the graduate applies to p his most preferred
universities (see formula (7)). The preferences of universities are given by
Sujg = εujg + Vu × Jg, for ∀j = 1, ..., N with Vu = 1.
The main results are the following (see Figure 7). First, the restriction on
the number of applications p inﬂuences the level α chosen by the deviating
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graduate. Misrepresenting the list of most preferred positions is not a worthy
strategy when graduates can apply almost everywhere. But when graduates
are very much restricted in the length of the application list (p is small), the
beneﬁt of misrepresentation increases. Second, we ﬁnd that the optimal α
decreases with the quality of the graduate, identiﬁed by the diﬀerent types
in Figure 7. More precisely, a not very competitive graduate will choose
a high level of α, an average graduate will prefer an intermediate level of
α, and a very good graduate will choose lower α. In other words, while
a good candidate does not beneﬁt from misrepresenting of the list of most
preferred positions, a not very good candidate can decrease his ineﬃciency
substantially by applying to not very popular universities (where the most
of other candidates would not apply). Third, the level of correlation among
graduates, Vg is important to determine the optimal strategy.
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